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Abstract. We analyze the extent to which individualschoices over ve employer-
provided insurance coverage decisions and one 401(k) investment decision exhibit sys-
tematic patterns, as would be implied by a general utility component of risk preferences.
In particular, we examine whether individuals display a stable ranking in their willing-
ness to bear risk, relative to their peers, across the di¤erent contexts. We provide
evidence consistent with an individual-specic but domain-general component that op-
erates across all of the choices. This component appears substantial among the ve
insurance domains; we nd, for example, that ones choices in other insurance domains
are substantially more predictive of ones choice in a given insurance domain than either
ones detailed demographic characteristics or ones claims experience in that domain.
However, we nd considerably less predictive power between ones insurance choices and
the riskiness of ones 401(k) asset allocations, suggesting that the common element of an
individuals preferences may be stronger among domains that are closer in context.
We also nd that the relationship between insurance and investment choices appears
larger for individuals who may be associated with better 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timates from a stylized coverage choice model suggest that up to 30 percent of our
sample makes choices that may be consistent across all six domains.
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1 Introduction
Standard models in many elds of economics  most notably macroeconomics, nance, public
nance, and labor economics generally use a canonical model for decisions under uncertainty, in
which individuals (or households) have a single, concave utility function over wealth, which gives
rise to context-invariant risk preferences. Guided by this assumption, standard practice in these
literatures is to use external estimates of risk aversion parameters, drawn from a variety of specic
contexts, to calibrate their models. At the other end of the spectrum, there is a large literature in
psychology and behavioral economics arguing that there is little, if any, commonality in how the
same individual makes decisions across di¤erent contexts. Where does reality lie relative to these
two extremes? Our aim in this paper is to provide new empirical evidence that informs this issue
by using unique data on thousands of individuals and analyzing actual decisions that each of them
make regarding nancial lotteries in di¤erent domains.
Specically, we examine the workplace-based benet choices that Alcoa employees make con-
cerning their 401(k) asset allocations, their short-term disability insurance, their long-term disabil-
ity insurance, and their insurance choices regarding health, drug, and dental expenditures. Using
these data, we investigate the stability in ranking across contexts of an individuals willingness to
bear risk relative to his peers. In other words, we investigate how well an individuals willingness
to bear risk (relative to his peers) in one context predicts his willingness to bear risk (relative to
his peers) in other contexts.
There are several attractive features of our setting for this purpose. First, all the decisions
are solely over the extent of exposure to purely nancial risk; this reduces concerns about other
possible domain-specic components of preferences, such as an individuals monetary valuation of
health or idiosyncratic preferences for a given physician. Second, and relatedly, the nature of the
contract options makes the di¤erent choices within each domain vertically rankable in terms of risk
exposure. As a result, we can use these data to investigate the extent to which an individuals
risk aversion relative to his peers in one domain can inform us about his risk aversion relative to
those same peers in other contexts. Third, as we shall see, the risk exposure involved in these
choices is non-trivial, so that the decisions we observe are economically meaningful. Finally, many
of the domains involve expected risks of similar magnitudes, making decisions across contexts more
comparable.
Our focus is on quantifying the empirical importance of any individual-specic, domain-general
component of preferences rather than on testing the extreme nulls of complete consistency or no
consistency in preferences across domains. Neither extreme null strikes us as particularly compelling
in practice; reality almost surely lies in between. Perhaps more importantly, as we discuss in
more detail below, while it seems possible to plausibly test the null hypothesis that there is no
domain-general component to preferences (and we will do so), we argue that it is considerably
more challenging (perhaps even impossible) to robustly test the other extreme hypothesis that
individuals decisions are completely consistent across domains. Tests of the latter hypothesis
would inevitably consist of a joint test of the null hypothesis of domain-general preferences as well
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as a set of additional di¢ cult-to-test modeling assumptions.
A key challenge that we face in developing an approach to quantifying the extent of domain
generality of preferences, is that in our interest to examine the stability of preferences across
contexts, we would like to avoid context-specic modeling assumptions that could push us toward
one nding or another. A natural way to evaluate the stability of risk preferences across domains
would be to write down a model of consumer behavior, use the data and the model to obtain
estimates for risk aversion for each individual in each domain, and then compare these estimates.
Cohen and Einav (2007) provide a framework for inferring risk aversion from insurance choices,
which could be adapted to our various contexts. However, their framework also illustrates that
estimating the distribution of risk aversion from individualsinsurance choices involves a number
of domain-specic modeling assumptions regarding the nature of ex-ante information, expectation
formation, the risk realization process, the nature of heterogeneity in risk and risk preferences, the
possibility of moral hazard, and the class of utility functions. While these assumptions are not a
problem per se, in assessing the extent of domain generalizability of preferences, one would naturally
worry greatly about the role of domain-specic modeling assumptions. Given this challenge, in this
paper we shy away from specifying a complete model of primitives for each domain. Instead, we
pursue two other complementary strategies that allow us to make progress in investigating the
motivating question while trying to minimize the need for domain-specic modeling assumptions.
Our rst strategy takes a model free,statistical perspective. We avoid any economic modeling
of primitives and instead focus on the within-person correlation in the ordinal ranking of the
riskiness of the choice an individual makes across di¤erent domains. In other words, we ask whether
individuals who appear to be more willing to bear risk than their peers in one context are also more
willing to bear risk in another context. Our results reject the null hypothesis that there is no domain-
general component of preferences: individuals choices across domains are positively correlated.
More interestingly, in our view, we develop several benchmarks that help us assess the extent of
this domain-general component of preferences, and we nd it to be quantitatively quite important.
For example, we nd that ones choices in other insurance domains have about four times more
predictive power for ones choice in a given insurance domain than do a rich set of demographics.
However, we nd that the riskiness of ones 401(k) portfolio choice has statistically signicant but
quantitatively much smaller predictive power for ones insurance choices. Interestingly, we also nd
that the predictive power of ones 401(k) portfolio choice for ones insurance choices is systematically
greater for individuals who are older, have more experience within the rm, have higher income,
or who appear to be more nancially sophisticated (as measured by external proxies in the data).
This suggests that such individuals may t better the canonical model.
The advantage of this model freeapproach is that it allows us to make inferences that are much
more robust to various assumptions. In particular, the approach only requires us to assume that
any unobserved individual- and domain-specic components in a given domain are rank preserving;
it does not require us, for example, to take a stand on the nature of the utility function or on
the way in which individuals form expectations, weight probabilities, and so on. The drawback
of a model freeapproach is that the results cannot be directly mapped to underlying economic
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primitives. While we attempt to develop several benchmarks that may help in assessing whether
the correlations we nd point to a greater or lesser importance of the domain-general component
of preferences, one can reasonably argue that such benchmarks are somewhat ad hoc.
Indeed, our second empirical approach attempts to link our results to underlying economic
primitives. In particular, we estimate the fraction of our sample that makes choices across domains
that can potentially be rationalized with a common risk aversion parameter. We write down a
stylized model, which allows us to use the same (stylized) model across the di¤erent domains.
This strategy trades o¤ the need for a model-based framework with the concern mentioned above
regarding too many domain-specic modeling assumptions. The key decision in this respect is as
in our rst strategy to focus on comparing the ranking of risk aversion rather than the levels. We
do so in our second approach by allowing for a domain-specic (but constant across individuals)
parameter, which essentially frees up the level of risk aversion in any context. While this minimizes
the number of domain specic assumptions, it still requires us to make some assumptions that were
not needed for our rst, model freeapproach.
Our baseline results suggest that, subject to a domain-specic (but not individual specic) free
parameter, just over 30 percent of our sample make decisions that could be rationalized across all
six domains. This result appears robust to a number of variations to our baseline specication.
In addition, we once again nd evidence suggesting that preferences are less consistent across
less closedomains, particularly between the 401(k) asset allocation and the other ve, insurance
domains.
Overall, we view our ndings from the two complementary approaches as generally supportive
of a fair amount of domain generality in decision making under uncertainty. We should recall,
however, our decision to focus on the stability across contexts in the relative ranking of individuals
risk preferences, rather than the stability of the absolute level of risk aversion. While appealing in
reducing the necessary assumptions we need to make, this decision also makes it a more modest
test of the canonical model. For example, our ndings of a reasonable degree of consistency in
individualsrelative ranking of risk preferences across domains does not preclude a rank preserving
di¤erence in the entire distribution of willingness to bear risk across domains. In addition, our
ndings of higher correlation in risk preferences across closercontexts suggests that our ndings
of quantitatively meaningful domain generality may not persist if we looked at more disparate
contexts than those studied in this paper. We return to this briey in the conclusion.
Our study is not alone in its interest in the relative generality of risk preferences across di¤erent
contexts. Not surprisingly, given its importance, the stability of risk preferences across domains
has received considerable attention in the economics literature.1 Several studies have addressed
the stability of risk preferences by investigating individual responses to nancial lotteries across
1Naturally, there is also an important related literature in psychology. Although we do not cover it in detail,
many of its features are quite similar to the economics literature we do cover. See, for example, Slovic (1962, 1972a,
1972b) for earlier reviews of this literature and Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002) for a recent paper. See also Schoemaker
(1993), who provides an interesting discussion of the contrasting conceptual frameworks by which economists and
psychologists address the issue.
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di¤erent types of lotteries and over time (Choi et al., 2007; Andersen et al., 2008a; Kimball, Sahm,
and Shapiro, 2009). Cutler and Glaeser (2005) used a similar approach to investigate correlations
in health-related behaviors, for which they use data on self-reported behaviors, such as smoking
and drinking rather than answers to hypothetical lotteries. The inuential paper by Barsky et al.
(1997) has analyzed similar hypothetical questions and also validated the responses to some of these
questions by investigating whether they are correlated with self-reported behaviors.2 A recent study
by Dohmen et al. (2011) is probably the closest of this literature to our rst approach; somewhat
similar to Barsky et al. (1997), Dohmen et al. (2011) use a large data set of survey responses to
hypothetical nancial lottery questions and validate these responses using self-reported behaviors
of a subset of the respondents. Like us, they nd an important component of domain-general risk
preferences and conclude that although its absolute explanatory power is small, it performs pretty
well when compared to other predictors of risk taking.
Our paper di¤ers from this existing literature in several respects. Perhaps most importantly,
our study is based on actual market choices. By contrast, many of the existing studies rely on
individual responses to hypothetical questions (e.g., Barsky et al., 1997) or to self-reported behaviors
(e.g., Cutler and Glaeser, 2005). A possible concern with such measures for assessing the domain-
generality of an individuals risk preferences is that there may be important individual-specic
elements that a¤ect the mapping from self reported or elicited preferences to actual preferences,
which may appear as domain-general preferences. An approach that circumvents many of these
concerns is the use of lab experiments with real consequences associated with the choices (e.g.,
Choi et al., 2007) or eld experiments with a representative sample of a population, again involving
choices with real (and non trivial) payo¤s (e.g., Andersen et al., 2008a). Nonetheless, as Harrison
et al. (2007) nicely show, mapping choices made in the lab to choices made in naturally occurring
settings is not at all straightforward. This distinction makes it important to combine data from
inside and outside the lab, either within the same paper as in Andersen et al. (2008b) or across
papers, to which the current study contributes.
We are aware of only one other study of the stability of risk preferences across contexts that
uses actual market outcomes. Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum (forthcoming) and Barseghyan
et al. (2010) have recently used data on three similar deductible choices made in the context of auto
and homeowner insurance to estimate an individuals risk aversion in each domain, to test whether
they can reject the null that risk aversion is completely general across domains, and to explain the
deviations they nd using a non-expected utility framework. Our second approach is quite similar
to theirs. It di¤ers primarily in its scope we look at a much broader, and less similar, range of
domains and, relatedly, in its focus and empirical approach. Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum
(forthcoming) focus on testing whether the level of risk aversion displayed in di¤erent contexts
is completely stable across contexts; they reject the null of fully domain-general risk aversion.
By contrast, we focus on quantifying (rather than testing) the extent of domain generality in risk
preferences after allowing for a domain-specic free component of risk preferences. Their approach is
2See also Chabris et al. (2008) for a similar exercise that focuses on discount rate (rather than on risk preferences).
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a more ambitious one but relies on commensurately greater context-specic modeling assumptions,
which are less troublesome in their more closely related domains. We therefore view the papers
(and their results) as highly complementary.
Another contribution of our paper which also applies to the papers by Chabris et al. (2008)
and Dohmen et al. (2011)  is our attempt to quantify the magnitude of any domain-general
component of preferences by benchmarking it against plausible alternatives. Most of the studies
we have discussed generally nd some common element in risk taking within an individual across
decisions (or behaviors), although for the most part they tend to argue  on mostly subjective
grounds that this common element is small.One of our ndings is that the ostensibly small
R2s that many prior papers have found may not in fact be as small when compared to relevant
benchmarks.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our institutional setting and
data. Section 3 presents our model freeapproach and correlation results concerning the stability
in individuals relative ranking of risk preferences across contexts. Section 4 presents estimates
from our second, model-based approach regarding the fraction of individuals whose choices may be
rationalized across domains. Section 5 concludes.
2 Setting and Data
We analyze the employee benet choices from 2004 for the U.S.-based workers at Alcoa, Inc., a
large multinational producer of aluminum and aluminum-related products. In 2004 Alcoa had
approximately 45,000 active U.S. employees working at about 300 di¤erent plants located in 39
states.
We focus primarily on choices made in 2004, because Alcoa introduced a new set of benet
options in 2004, requiring workers to make new, activechoices in many of the domains we study.
As a result, the problems of inferring preferences from stale choices is minimized; this could
be particularly concerning if individuals might have made their choices about di¤erent benets at
di¤erent points in time.
We examine employee choices in six di¤erent contexts. These include ve insurance coverage
decisions (health, prescription drugs, dental, and short-term and long-term disability) and one de-
cision regarding the asset allocation of the employees 401(k) contributions. All insurance choices
are made during the open enrollmentperiod in November and apply to the subsequent calendar
year. The 401(k) contributions are made automatically every pay-period according to a pre-specied
choice of investment allocations, which in principle could be adjusted at any given time (although
in practice only about one quarter of the employees in our sample change the allocation of their
contributions during a given year). For each choice we observe the menu of options the employee
faces (including prices) and the employees choice from the menu. We also observe detailed demo-
graphic information on the employees and detailed information on the realization of risks during
the coverage period.
Prices for the benet options vary across employees for two reasons. First, for the health, drug,
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and dental domains, employees have a choice of coverage tier; that is, whether to cover themselves
only, or to include their spouse, their children, or the entire family. Throughout this paper we
take the coverage tier as given, assuming that it is primarily driven by family structure; we show
below that our results are not sensitive to controlling for coverage tier. There is also important
cross-sectional variation in the prices associated with each of the insurance options as well as in
employer match rates for 401(k) contributions, which we will control for in our analysis.3
Baseline sample. Our baseline sample makes a number of restrictions that bring the original
2004 sample of approximately 45,000 active employees down to just under 13,000 employees. First,
we restrict our sample to those who were o¤ered the new benets in 2004; this includes approxi-
mately all salaried employees but only about one-half of hourly employees, since the benets pro-
vided to union employees (who are all hourly employees) can only change when the union contract
expires (so most union employees experienced the change in benets only in subsequent years). This
brings our sample size down to about 26,000 employees. We further restrict the sample to those
for which we observe full data on the options they are o¤ered, the choices made, and (for insurance
choices) the ex-post realized risk (claims). This precludes, for example, about 8% of the individuals
who chose to opt out from Alcoa-provided health and drug insurance coverage and about 11% of
employees who chose HMO coverage.4 We also drop about 22% of the remaining employees who
(because of a choice made by their section manager) are not o¤ered long-term disability insurance,
as well as the approximately 20% of employees who do not contribute to their 401(k) account.5 In
some of our robustness analyses we add back some of these excluded individuals.
Our nal baseline sample contains 12,752 employees. Panel A of Table 1 provides demographic
characteristics for this sample. The sample is almost three quarters male and 85 percent white,
with an average age of 44, an average job tenure (within Alcoa) of 13 years, and an average annual
salary of $58,400. Only about one-third of the sample is hourly employees and virtually none are
unionized (due to our requirement that they face the new benet options in 2004). The average
number of covered individuals per employee is 2.9. Panel B of Table 1 provides summary statistics
on the annual payouts for each of the six domains. We now describe the options in each domain in
3Specically, the prices faced by the employee are determined by which section of the company the employee is in.
Alcoa has about 40 di¤erent sections (business units). In 2004, each sections head could select from among the
o¤ered menus of benet prices set by Alcoa headquarters (see Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen (2010) for a much
more detailed description). In our sample, there are 20 di¤erent possible benet menus which we control for in the
analysis using benet menu xed e¤ects. For health, drug, and dental the menus vary in the employee premiums. For
short-term and long-term disability they vary in the replacement rate associated with the (xed) premium, although
the incremental coverage is almost always the same across menus. In the 401(k) domain employees face one of four
di¤erent possible employer match rates (0, 50%, 75%, or 100%).
4As is typical in data sets like ours, we do not observe medical expenditures for employees covered by an HMO or
who opted out of employer-provided coverage. It is also di¢ cult to analyze the choice of either of these two options
since the prices are not known, nor is it entirely clear how to dene the good being purchased (or to rank it in
terms of risk exposure).
5Note that the lowest priced option for dental, short-term disability, and long-term disability is free, so that
e¤ectively there is no opt outoption for these domains.
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more detail.
Description of coverage options. As mentioned, we investigate employees choices over six
di¤erent domains. Table 2 summarizes the key features of each domain, with the options enumerated
within each domain (as presented in the Alcoa brochures) from the lowest level of coverage (option
1) to the option that o¤ers the most coverage. Appendix Tables A1 and A2 provide more detailed
information on each benet option.
The rst domain is health insurance, where employees can choose from among ve PPO options.6
These options only vary in their nancial coverage, and (with the exception of option 1) are vertically
rankable,7 with the deductible level being the key di¤erence.8 Option 1 stipulates a high annual
deductible of 3,000 dollars (for non-single coverage), while option 5 stipulates no deductible. Slightly
over half of the employees choose the safest option (option 5), about one quarter choose the second
safest option, and about 17 percent choose the least safe option (option 1).
The second domain covers prescription drug coverage, and employees are o¤ered three options
that vary in their cost sharing for branded drugs, from 30 percent to 50 percent cost sharing for
retail branded drugs (deductible and coverage of generics are the same across options). Almost two
thirds choose the safest option and one-quarter choose the least safe option.
The third domain is dental coverage, which o¤ers two options that primarily vary in their
annual maximum benet, of 1,000 vs. 2,000 dollars. About 70 percent of employees choose the
safest option.
The fourth and fth domains are short-term and long-term disability insurance. Short-term
disability insurance covers disability-related lost earnings of durations up to six months, while
long-term disability insurance covers (less frequent) longer durations. Employees are given a choice
of 3 options for each disability insurance coverage, with the replacement rate varying across options.
Unlike the rst three domains, the pricing and benets associated with disability insurance are not
given in absolute dollars, but rather are proportional to the employees annual wage. Thus, the
6Employees could also choose an HMO or to opt out from health and drug coverage entirely, but those employees
who chose these options are excluded from our baseline sample, for reasons described earlier.
7The exception is the cheapest health insurance option (option 1), which is set up as a Health Reimbursement
Account (HRA) in which Alcoa contributes each year $1,250 in tax free money that the employee can use to fund
eligible out-of-pocket health care expenses. Any balance remaining at the end of the year can be rolled over to pay
for future out-of-pocket costs (as long at the employee remains enrolled in this plan). At retirement (or severance)
remaining balances can be used to pay for Alcoa-sponsored retiree health care plan premiums (or toward elected
COBRA coverage). Since the nancial tax benets associated with an HRA vary across individuals (based on
their marginal tax rates, their expectation regarding future employment with Alcoa, and so on), this introduces a
non-vertical component to the health insurance choice. In the robustness analysis below we verify that results are
qualitatively similar when we omit the set of individuals who chose this option, but since this set is quite large our
preferred specication and analysis simply ignores the tax benets associated with the HRA.
8While there is additional variation across plans in the out-of-pocket maximum and corresponding coverage details
of out-of-network expenditure, individuals rarely (less than one percent) reach this out-of-pocket maximum, and only
infrequently (less than ve percent) use out-of-network services. The out-of-pocket maximum also allows us to
abstract from tail risk, which is covered by all options similarly, up to the very similar out-of-pocket maximum across
options.
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up-front premiums each employee faces vary based on his or her wage, and the benets are given
as (wage) replacement ratesthat are typically 60% and 50% (for short- and long-term coverage,
respectively) for the least coverage option and 100% and 70% (respectively) for the options that
o¤er most coverage. About two thirds of the employees choose the highest replacement rate for
each option. In each domain, the remaining employees are roughly equally split between the two
lower replacement rate options.
The sixth and nal domain is the 401(k) asset allocation. As is common in many rms, Al-
coa employees are encouraged to contribute every pay-period to their 401(k) account, with Alcoa
matching such contributions up to 6%. In our analysis we abstract from the employeesdecisions
as to whether and how much to contribute, but rather focus on how contributing employees choose
to allocate their contributions across assets. All employees can allocate their contributions and
balances among 13 di¤erent funds that are available to them, and in principle are allowed to con-
tinuously adjust these allocations (although they infrequently do so; for example, only one-quarter
of our sample changes its asset allocation during 2004). The funds vary in their riskiness (see
Appendix Table A2). To simplify the analysis, we focus on the employeesdecisions as to what
fraction of their contributions they allocate to the two risk-free funds during 2004.9 About two
fths of employees allocate none of these contributions to the risk-free funds, and about 17% of
employees allocate all of their contributions to the risk free funds.
Although describing the options and outcomes in each domain is useful, our understanding
of the choices is perhaps best guided by the incremental trade-o¤s associated with each choice.
Columns (2) through (4) of Table 2 provide two (rough) attempts to quantify the relative risk
exposure associated with the di¤erent choices within a domain. Column (2) does this by reporting
the average incremental premium saving in the sample from choosing a given option relative to the
least risk exposure option. Columns (3) and (4) report, respectively, the expected and standard
deviation of the incremental costs that the employee would face (counterfactually for most of the
sample) with the option shown relative to the safest option, if he were to be randomly drawn from
our baseline sample. These incremental costs are calculated based on the coverage details and the
distribution of realized claims.10 The most interesting point we take away from Table 2 is that the
incremental decisions across each domain are quite comparable in their expected magnitude, with
incremental (annual) premiums (and associated benets) ranging from several hundred to a few
9These two funds are not totally risk free, but they are marketed to employees as the least risky funds, and
the standard deviation of their (monthly) returns (0.02 and 0.83) is much smaller than that of the other investment
options (which range from 1.36 to 6.71). The results remain similar if we dene only the fund with the lowest standard
deviation as the risk free allocation, which is not surprising given that the lowest standard deviation fund receives
25% of 401(k) asset allocations, compared to only 4% for the second lowest standard deviation fund. See Appendix
Table A2 for more detail.
10 In our data, expected incremental costs (column (3)) are sometimes higher than incremental premiums (column
(2)) suggesting (contrary to fact) that all weakly risk averse individuals will buy the safest option. This is at least
partially due to our (unrealistic) simplifying assumption (for the construction of this table) that all individuals are
drawn from the same risk distribution. As long as an individual believes there is a su¢ ciently low probability of the
relevant claim, he may not prefer the safest option.
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thousand dollars. Of course, the overall magnitudes of the underlying risks can vary vastly (e.g.,
between long-term disability and dental), but the incremental coverage which is the key for the
coverage choice is of a much more similar magnitude across domains.
Attractions of our setting. The data and setting o¤er several key attractive features for inves-
tigating the extent to which individuals display a common ranking in their risk aversion relative
to their peers across domains. First, within all domains, the di¤erences across di¤erent choices are
purely in the amount of nancial risk exposure. They do not involve, for example, di¤erences in ac-
cess restrictions to health care providers or di¤erent service quality by asset fund managers. Such
di¤erences would have introduced additional domain-specic elements of the choices that would
make interpretation of the results more di¢ cult. Relatedly, since the choices within a domain dif-
fer only in the amount of nancial risk exposure, they can each be collapsed to a unidimensional
vertical ranking of the amount of nancial risk one is exposed to in di¤erent choices. This makes
it relatively straightforward to assess how much more likely it is for individuals who assume more
vs. less risk compared to their peers in one domain to assume more vs. less risk in another domain
compared to their peers.
Second, as shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2, all of the domains are plausibly valuable
and sensible insurance from an economic standpoint. That is, they all represent potentially large
expenditures with real ex ante uncertainty to the individual. For example, the coe¢ cient of variation
of incremental costs (computed based on columns (3) and (4)) is always greater than one third,
and mostly greater than one. This is a much more appealing setting for studying the extent to
which choices across domains display a common risk aversion component than looking at settings in
which it is unclear why individuals are buying insurance in the rst instance, such as insurance for
internal wiring protection (as in, e.g., Cicchetti and Dubin, 1994) and other types of insurance
products that cover against very small losses, which Rabin and Thaler (2001) argue is where people
are perhaps most likely to depart from the canonical model of decision under uncertainty.
Third, as discussed earlier (and shown in Table 2, columns (2) and (3)), the choices within a
domain are over similarly sized risks.
Fourth, many of the benet options are entirely new in 2004, and the old options were no
longer available. This means that for these benet options we are looking at decisions made at the
same time period and do not have to worry about staledecisions in some domains reecting a
combination of inertia and outdated risk preferences.11 Specically, the health, drug and dental
options were all completely new  the old options were no longer available in these domains 
while the disability options remained the same but their prices changed; the 401(k) options did
not change.12 As a further check against the possibility of staledecisions (particularly for 401(k)
11Given the substantial evidence on inertia in insurance choices (see Handel (2010) for a recent example) we
would worry greatly about examining choices that may have been made a long time earlier (when an individuals
characteristics may be di¤erent from what we currently observe) and/or at di¤erent times for di¤erent products.
12We also know the default options for each domain which are: health insurance option 4, drug insurance option 3
single coverage, and for dental, short- and long-term disability the default is ones prior years choice if he or she was
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allocations and potentially disability choices), we show in our robustness analysis that results look
similar when restricted to a sample of new hires, for whom decisions in all six domains had to be
made recently.
Fifth, and relatedly, with the exception of the 401(k) asset allocation decisions, the nature of
the employee benet selections eliminates many potential domain-specic elements of the choice;
all the insurance benets are presented in the same format (all on the same benet worksheet)
and must be chosen during the same open enrollment period. Thus, we do not have to worry, for
example, about time-varying events, di¤erential e¤ort or ability of insurance agents, etc.
Sixth, there is some interesting variation across the six domains in the closeness of the do-
mains. In particular, it seems that some domains (such as short-term and long-term disability
insurance) are quite similar while others (such as health insurance and 401(k) decisions) are more
di¤erent. Therefore, it is interesting to see if the extent of correlation in choices within an individual
across domains varies by their relative closeness.Of course, the range spanned by our choices is
much narrower than the full set of decisions under uncertainty that individuals make; in the end of
the paper we discuss some of the challenges in extending the study to a broader range of domains.
Finally, but very importantly, the data are extremely clean and complete. We observe all the
details of the choice set, the choice made, the setting in which the choice is made, a measure of risk
occurrence, and relatively rich demographic information.
3 A Model FreeApproach
3.1 Empirical Strategy
Given our interest in the extent to which individualsranking in their risk aversion relative to their
peers displays a common component across domains, a natural empirical approach is to examine
the rank correlation in individuals choices from among the (vertically ranked) options in each
domain. We thus begin by reporting pairwise Spearman rank correlations across domains. A
disadvantage to this approach, however, is that it does not readily lend itself to controlling for
potentially important covariates, nor does it lend itself as easily to a construction of comparative
benchmarks with which to gauge the relative importance of the domain-general component of risk
preferences that we detect.
We therefore also examine the correlation structure of the error terms from a system of six
previously employed (or no coverage, lowest option, and middle option respectively if they are a new hire). Of course,
people in these allocations may also have chosen them actively. In our robustness analysis we explore sensitivity to
excluding people who, based on their allocations, may not be active choosers.
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where xi is a vector of control variables (which is the same in all equations in the system of
equations),  is a vector of domain-specic coe¢ cients, and the main object of interest is the
correlation matrix of the residuals.
We estimate this system in two separate ways. We rst treat each equation as an ordered probit
specication (except the 401(k) equation, which is treated as a regular equation with a continuous
dependent variable)  that is, we assume that the six residuals are drawn from a multivariate
normal distribution, and that the dependent variable is a latent domain-specic variable that maps
a one-dimensional index into a discrete ordered coverage choice.13 This specication treats properly
the ordinal nature of the choices, but has the disadvantage that it does not lend itself to a natural
R2 measure, which we use later to compare the predictive power of di¤erent variables. We therefore
also estimate the system of equations above using multivariate least squares, by enumerating the
choices from 1 to n in each domain (as in Table 2), and assigning them a cardinal interpretation
despite their ordinal nature. This specication does not require us to assume that the errors are
distributed normally and, more importantly, makes it natural to use R2 to compare results across
di¤erent specications. As we report below, the correlation results that we obtain from the three
specications the rank correlation, the system of ordered probits, and the multivariate regression
analysis are all very similar.
Because standard theory models insurance choices as driven by risk and risk aversion, it is
essential to control for risk if one wants to make inferences about risk aversion. The baseline set of
control variables (xi) we include in the ordered probit and multivariate least squares specications
are dummy variables for the menu of benets the employee faced (described above). We also
explore the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of additional controls (in all six equations)
that proxy for individual risk in each of the ve insurance domains. We attempt to control for two
components of risk; the rst is risk that can be predicted using observables, and the second is an
individual-specic risk component, which is idiosyncratic to the individual.
To proxy for the predictable component of risk, we use two measures. The rst measure is
based on a statistical model of realized risk in each domain on a exible functional form of our
observables; we generate and then use as controls the model predictions.14 A second measure of
13We estimate this model using maximum likelihood. The estimation is performed using the cmp user-provided
package in STATA. See http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456882.html and Roodman (2009).
14The results are not at all sensitive to the precise way we predict risk. For the results we report below, risk is
predicted from a linear regression of realized risk (dollar spending for health, drug, and dental insurance; and days of
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predictable (health) risk is based on software that predicts future medical spending on the basis
of previous yearsdetailed medical diagnoses and claims, as well as demographics.15 To proxy for
the idiosyncratic component of risk we use the realization of that risk in the subsequent coverage
period. That is, if individual risk is realized from an individual-specic distribution, conditional
on observable risk, the realization of risk can be used as a (noisy) proxy for the underlying ex-
ante individual-specic risk type. The identication arguments in Cohen and Einav (2007) and in
Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf (2010) use a similar idea. Finally, to allow for correlation in both
observed and unobserved heterogeneity in risk across domains, we include controls for all our proxies
in all the insurance domains. That is, each equation includes eleven control variables, containing
predicted and realized risk in each of the ve insurance domains, as well as the software-generated
prediction of health risk.
3.2 Results
Table 3(a) presents the baseline correlation results, when we do not use additional control variables
(except for benet menu xed e¤ects in Panels B and C). Panel A shows the full set of Spearman
rank correlation coe¢ cients between each pair of domains. It also reports (at the bottom) the simple
average of the fteen correlations, as a single summary measure. Panel B shows the estimated
correlation from the system of ordered probit specications (and a single 401(k) linear equation),
and Panel C shows the correlations from the baseline multivariate regression described above. In
general, we can (easily) reject the null hypothesis of a correlation of zero.
By rejecting the null hypothesis of a correlation of zero, we can reject the null of no domain-
general component of choice. Viewed alternatively, we nd that ones coverage choice in every other
domain has some predictive power for his or her choice in a given domain. Although the nding
that risk preferences are correlated across domains may be viewed as hardly surprising, from the
perspective of the canonical model, it is encouraging to nd this positive correlation so robustly
across a broad range of contexts.
This test of the admittedly not very compelling null of no domain-general component of choices
is subject to the important caveat that non-preference factors may introduce correlations across
domains. In the case of insurance, a natural suspect is potential correlation in underlying (unpriced)
risk across the insurance domains. Such an issue does not arise in the context of the correlation
between 401(k) portfolio allocation and choices in an insurance domain, making this perhaps the
disability for either disability insurance) on: (i) cubic splines for age, wage, and job tenure; (ii) dummy variables for
gender, race, employee type (hourly or salary), union status, single coverage for health benets, family size, and state
xed e¤ects; and (iii) interaction variables between age and the gender, employee type, and single coverage dummy
variables.
15This is a relatively sophisticated way of predicting medical spending as it takes into account the di¤erential
persistence of di¤erent types of medical claims (e.g., diabetes vs. car accident) in addition to overall utilization,
demographics, and a rich set of interactions among these measures. The particular software we use is a risk adjustment
tool called DXCG risk solution which was developed by Verisk Health (http://www.veriskhealth.com/) and is used,
e.g., by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid services in determining reimbursement rates. See Carlin and Town
(2010) and Handel (2010) for other examples of academic uses of this type of predictive diagnostic software.
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most compelling context to test the null of complete domain specicity.
To try to address the concern about underlying risk correlations across insurance domains,
Table 3(b) reports the analogous results after we add control variables (as explained earlier) for
both predicted and realized risk in all domains in each equation. Panel A reports results from
the specication of a system of ordered probits and Panel B for the multivariate regression.16 The
results, again, are very similar across the two specications, and quite remarkably the magnitude
of the correlations generally remains almost the same as in Table 3(a), with only a slight decline
(the decline is to be expected, given that the risks are positively correlated across domains). While
predicted and realized risk do not control perfectly for ones ex ante risk expectations, the small
e¤ect that these controls have on the correlation pattern suggests that these correlations are more
likely to capture correlation in underlying risk preferences. This is also consistent with recent
results in the context of fully specied economic models that heterogeneity in risk preferences
plays a much greater role than heterogeneity in risks in explaining the heterogeneity in insurance
coverage choices (Cohen and Einav, 2007; Barseghyan, Prince, and Teitelbaum, forthcoming).
Across all panels of Table 3(a) and Table 3(b) we see that the average pairwise correlation
is 0.16 to 0.26. Perhaps not surprisingly, there is a pronounced pattern of substantially higher
correlation coe¢ cients between pairs that are more similar. For example, in panel B of Table
3(a), the correlation between drug and health coverage choices is 0.55 and the correlation between
long-term and short-term disability insurance choices is 0.77. By contrast, health insurance and
short-term disability insurance show only a 0.29 correlation and the lowest pairwise correlations
are between the share of risk free assets in ones 401(k) portfolio and any of the insurance coverage
choices (all of which are 0.07 or less). Of course, it is not clear how informative this nding is since
comparisons of correlations between di¤erent pairs are di¢ cult to interpret due, for example, to
di¤erences in the discreteness and pricing of the relative options in each domain.
We also examine how the correlation in choices varies across di¤erent identiable groups. Table
4(a) and Table 4(b) present the main results for the ordered probit and multivariate specications,
respectively. Specically, the results show selected correlations for di¤erent pairs of groups of
employees. While many pairwise correlations seem to be quite similar across groups, the most
striking pattern in Table 4 is in column (5), which shows a consistent pattern that individuals
whom one might ex ante classify as likely to make better nancial decisions tend to have noticeably
higher correlations between health insurance choices and 401(k) decisions. This is true for older
individuals relative to younger individuals, for individuals with longer tenure with Alcoa (who
perhaps understand the systembetter), individuals with higher wages, and individuals who tend
to avoid what economists often view as unsophisticated nancial behavior, such as not rebalancing
the portfolio regularly. A similar pattern is observed across these groups in the correlations between
other insurance choices and the 401(k) decisions (not shown in the table in the interest of space).
One way to interpret these ndings is that while the correlation between insurance and 401(k)
investment choices is low in the overall sample, we nd a greater degree of domain-general risk aver-
16Table 3(b) does not report the Spearman rank correlations, for which it is less obvious how to add controls.
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sion once we focus on individuals who exhibit more nancial literacy,or at least seem to pay more
attention to their investment decisions. An alternative, plausible interpretation is that these results
suggest less error in risk perceptions or in the mapping from trueunderlying risk preferences to
choices, for individuals who appear to be more nancially literate"; such an interpretation could
suggest that the correlation results underestimate the importance of the domain-general component
of risk preferences in the full sample. This latter interpretation is consistent with a growing body
of empirical work suggesting that the propensity to succumb to psychological biases or to make
mistakes in nancial planning is higher for individuals of lower cognitive ability (Benjamin, Brown,
and Shapiro, 2006) and for individuals of lower nancial literacy or planning propensity (Ameriks,
Caplin, and Leahy, 2003; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007). Either interpretation suggests that one
might want to exercise more caution in using specic revealed preference estimates to calibrate risk
aversion levels in economic models, when they are applied to less sophisticated populations.
3.3 Robustness
We explored the robustness of our main correlation results (Table 3(a), Panels B and C) to various
alternative specications and samples. Tables 5 and 6 summarize the results of these analyses. As
in Table 4, in the interest of space, we do not report every pairwise correlation, but instead report
the average correlation and the correlations of three selected pairs. We explore two main types of
sensitivity analysis: alternative specications and alternative samples. Unless otherwise specied,
each row represents a single change relative to the baseline specication. Overall, the results seem
to be quite robust to the alternative exercises we explore.
Alternative specications and sample denitions. Table 3(a) already showed that the
Spearman rank correlations, the correlations estimates that are based on the system of ordered
probits, and the linear multivariate regression all lead to similar results. Table 3(b) has also shown
that the results are not a¤ected much by the inclusion of a large set of controls for risk. Row 1 of
the two panels of Table 5 replicates the baseline results (Table 3(a), panels B and C, respectively),
and the rest of the rows in the table examine additional plausible concerns.
Row 2 examines a concern that perhaps the reason that the 401(k) choice is less correlated
with all other insurance choices is driven by the fact that all insurance choices are discrete and
ordinal, while the 401(k) choice is continuous and has a cardinal interpretation. To investigate this
further, we discretize the 401(k) asset allocation decision and turn it into an ordinal measure, so
it is more similar in nature to the other choices. We do so by taking the (continuous) measure of
the percentage of employee contributions allocated to the safe funds, and convert it to a discrete
integer between 1 to 3, with 1 corresponding to investing nothing in the safe funds, 2 corresponding
to investing something but not everything in the safe funds, and 3 corresponding to investing
everything in the safe funds.
In row 3 we investigate the sensitivity of our results to including indicator variables for the
(four) coverage tiers (single coverage, employee plus spouse, employee plus children, and family
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coverage), and in row 4 we investigate concerns about whether our benet menu xed e¤ects fully
capture di¤erences in choices due to prices by limiting the sample to those who faced the prices in
the single largest benet menu (about 60 percent of our baseline sample).
The rest of the rows in Table 5 explore the sensitivity of our baseline specication to alternative
sample denitions. In rows 5 through 7 we add back in various employees who were excluded from
the baseline sample. In row 5 we include those employees who opted out of the health insurance
and drug insurance plans, or who chose an HMO for these plans. In row 6 we include employees
who did not contribute to their 401(k) plan in 2004, and in row 7 we include those employees who
were not o¤ered long-term disability insurance. In each case, we omit from the analysis the a¤ected
domains (health and drug in row 5, 401(k) in row 6, and long-term disability in row 7). As a result,
comparison of the average correlation to that in the baseline may be misleading, but the pairwise
ones are still informative, and we also report the comparable average correlation in the baseline
specication.
In row 8 we exclude from our analysis individuals who chose health insurance option 1, the lowest
coverage option. As mentioned in Section 2, this option is bundled with a Health Retirement
Account component, so it is not fully vertically rankable. In row 9 we limit the sample to the
slightly under 10 percent of the sample who were new hires in 2004. As discussed earlier, a primary
motivation for this analysis is to see if 401(k) contribution allocations are more correlated with
insurance choices when the 401(k) choice (like the insurance choice) must be a new and active
decision. In practice, there is no evidence that di¤erences in timing of the decision is driving
down the correlation between 401(k) asset allocation and insurance coverage. Finally, in row 10 we
exclude the roughly 11 percent of the individuals who might have been passivechoosers, given
that all their coverage decisions in the insurance domains were consistent with the default options.
Outside insurance and investment choices. A fundamental feature of our analysis is that
while we have good data on individualsdecisions and outcomes within Alcoa, naturally we have very
little information about any other of the individualsinsurance and investment portfolios, which are
external to Alcoa. Thus, we may be missing important pieces of the overall insurance coverage for
a particular risk, or the overall wealth portfolio. On the insurance front we are relatively sanguine.
Given the generosity of Alcoa benets relative to anything a spousal employer might provide, as
well as the well-known problems with private markets (that are not employer-provided) for these
insurance products, we think it is a reasonable approximation to assume that there is little non-
Alcoa insurance purchase. However, non-Alcoa investments are a potentially important concern.
To try to shed light on how important this may be for our results, we undertake two types of
exercises.
First, to try to proxy for outside investments, we construct measures of the individual employees
housing wealth and then repeat our analysis by stratifying on housing wealth, so that we are
comparing choices among individuals with relatively similar outside housing wealth. Of course, this
strategy does not address other nancial and non-nancial wealth in the employees portfolio. In
practice, however, the retirement component is large relative to other nancial assets for individuals
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with retirement nancial wealth, and housing wealth is a very large share of non-nancial wealth for
such individuals (Bucks, Kennickell, and Moore, 2006). Therefore, controlling for housing wealth
is likely a rst order improvement in trying to address the non-Alcoa portfolio composition. To
obtain data on housing, we matched the home addresses of our Alcoa employees to public records
containing information on their home value and their equity stake in their house; we were able to
link about one-third of our sample.17
The results are shown in Table 6. Once again we report estimates for the average correla-
tion, the health-drug correlation, the health-short term disability correlation and the health-401(k)
correlation. However, because this exercise may be particularly relevant for the sensitivity of the re-
lationship between 401(k) choices and insurance choices, we also report each of the 401(k)-insurance
product correlations. The rst row shows results for the full sample, while the second row shows
results for the sample for whom we were able to link in housing data (housing subsample). Rows
3-5 show results stratied (in roughly equally sized bins) by housing equity: less than $50,000,
$50,000 to $150,000, and above $150,000. The results are not overly sensitive to this stratication.
In particular, the basic pattern of much larger correlations among insurance choices than correla-
tion between 401(k) portfolio allocation and insurance choices remains. The correlations are also
extremely similar across employees with di¤erent equity levels or equity shares. For example, the
health insurance-401(k) correlation is always lower than 0.07 for all across equity levels, while the
correlation between health and drug coverage choices is always above 0.4. There does not seem to
be any consistent pattern of a monotone relationship between housing equity and the magnitude
of the various correlation coe¢ cients.
Second, we tried to dene a sample of employees who are less likely to have substantial non-
401(k) nancial investments by restricting the sample to employees who do not max out their
possible 401(k) contributions; because of the favorable tax treatment of 401(k) investments, it seems
plausible that individuals who are not saving as much as possible in tax preferred vehicles may have
less outside savings than those who are. We therefore divide the sample into the approximately 14
percent who have contributed the maximum allowable amount to their 401(k) and the remainder
who have not maxed out their allowable 401(k) contributions. The bottom two rows of Table 6
show that the results are broadly similar for the two groups. For example, the correlation between
401(k) portfolio allocation and insurance choice is slightly higher for those who have maxed out their
401(k) contributions for health insurance but slightly lower for the other four types of insurance.
The general pattern of much larger correlations among insurance choices than between 401(k)
portfolio allocation and insurance choices remains for both groups.
While of course these tests are limited in their nature, it is nonetheless reassuring to nd that
the results suggest that our inability to control for the entire wealth portfolio is unlikely to be
17The data were provided by a real estate data vendor DataQuick, which compiles data on real estate
from public records such as county recordings of ownerships and transactions, and county tax assessors. See
http://www.dataquick.com/sharedata.asp for more information. The employees for whom we were able to match
housing data are unlikely to be a random sample of our employees; for example, we were unable to match employees
with P.O. Boxes as addresses, and we likely have less success for counties without electronic records.
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having a large impact on the correlations we examine.
3.4 Benchmarks
As noted at the outset, our primary interest is in developing reasonable benchmarks against which
one can try to assess whether the correlation in the ordinal ranking of the riskiness of ones choices
across domains suggests a quantitatively large or small domain-general component of risk prefer-
ences. Comparing the estimated correlations to the benchmark correlation of one does not provide
a meaningful assessment of the extent of domain generality of preferences, or a test of the null of
complete domain generality of preferences. We would not expect a rank correlation of one even if
preferences were fully domain general.
For example, even if risk preferences are fully domain general, any discreteness and non-linearity
in the function that maps risk aversion to choices would make the correlation estimates lower,
potentially by a substantial amount. To illustrate this with a concrete example, suppose we observe
N individuals making choices in two domains (j and k), each of which o¤ers two discrete choices,
with choice 1 exposing the individual to more risk than choice 2: Even if preferences are fully
domain general, it is possible that due to the di¤erent pricing of options in the two domains, in
domain j the lowest risk aversion individual chooses option 1 while all N   1 other individuals
choose option 2, while in domain k the highest risk aversion individual chooses option 2 and all
N   1 other individuals choose option 1. While this allocation is consistent with an underlying
model of fully domain general preferences, the correlation of choices across the two domains will
approach zero as N gets su¢ ciently large.
In addition, in a fully domain general model with a single utility function over wealth, insurance
decisions are inter-related, and one essentially chooses a portfolio of insurance positions. In other
words, risk exposure in one domain may a¤ect (with ex ante ambiguous sign) ones willingness
to bear risk in another (even independent) domain (Gollier and Pratt, 1996; Guiso, Jappelli, and
Terlizzese, 1996). This background riskproblem introduces yet another reason why fully domain
general preferences need not produce a rank correlation of one across domains.
Our rst exercise that may allow us to start assessing whether the correlation estimates we
report are large or small is to compare the predictive power of choices in other domains to the
predictive power of demographic covariates. Table 7 reports these results. For each domain, it
reports the adjusted R2 from a multivariate regression of the (ordinal) coverage choice in this
domain on di¤erent subsets of covariates. All regressions are done on the residual coverage choice
(after partialing out the menu xed e¤ects). As one can see, the explanatory power (measured
by the adjusted R2) of the choices in other domains (row 1) is much greater for predicting ones
insurance choice in a di¤erent domain than the predictive power of ones risk type (row 2), or ones
detailed demographics (row 3). For example, the predictive power of choices in other domains is
at least four times greater than the predictive power of demographics in predicting the choice in
a given insurance domain. Even when we limit the choices in other domains to exclude the most
related coverage choice (row 4), the predictive power of the remaining choices is at least 1.5 times
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higher than that of demographics for the choice in a given insurance domain. The case of 401(k) is a
noted exception to this pattern. The explanatory power of the insurance choices (row 1) is an order
of magnitude lower than that of demographics. This is not a particularly surprising pattern, given
the relative distancebetween 401(k) and all the other choices, as well as potential di¤erences in
the timing (or framing) of the decision, and potential age-based preferences for the (longer horizon)
401(k) investments, which may make age a particularly important factor in 401(k) decisions.
A second exercise is to compare the correlation within person in choices across domains at a
point in time to the correlation within person in choices in a given domain over time. Here again
we can take advantage of the new benet design that Alcoa introduced in 2004, and compute the
correlation for health insurance choices between 2003 and 2004. In the old benet design (of
2003), individuals could choose from among three di¤erent coverage options (compared to ve in
the new design), with variation in out-of-pocket maximum being binding and important. These
three options were also vertically rankable from least to most coverage, just like other domains
in 2004, thus providing a similar structure, and a comparable benchmark. In the multivariate
regression, the correlation we nd between health insurance choices (of the same employee) in 2003
and 2004 is 0.198. This is similar to (or smaller than) the multivariate correlation estimates across
insurance domains reported in Table 3a, panel C, which range from 0.16 to 0.60.18
Our general conclusion from these benchmarks is that, contrary to our prior expectations, the
reported average correlations of 0.16-0.26 are in fact quite high, and suggestive of an important
domain-general component of risk preferences. To more specically quantify the extent of domain
generality of preferences requires that we link our results to underlying economic primitives. This
in turn requires to move from a statistical model to an economic model, which is the focus of the
next section.
4 A (Stylized) Model-Based Approach
4.1 A Calibration Exercise
We considered two (related) approaches to try to relate the statistical correlation in individuals
choices across domains to underlying economic primitives, namely coe¢ cients of risk aversion. One
approach would be to start with a fully specied model of coverage choice, assume a benet menu
similar to the one observed in the data, and assume full domain generality (by imposing a common
risk aversion parameter within an individual across domains). We could then simulate what the
correlation coe¢ cient between the implied coverage choices in di¤erent domains would be under
this assumption of full domain generality, and compare it to what we have observed. This would
allow us to obtain some benchmarks for the correlation coe¢ cients between choices generated by a
18One could also investigate correlation in choices over time without any change in benet design. The concern
about such an exercise is that inertic behavior would be driving much of the results, which is precisely the reason that
made us use the new benet design for the baseline exercise. Indeed, when we examine such correlations (looking at
years 2004 and 2005), we obtain correlation coe¢ cients of 0.85-0.9, presumably due to inertia.
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model with fully domain-general risk preferences, but subject to the non-linearities and discreteness
that arise because of the structure of the insurance options and the decision process.
In appendix A we describe such a calibration exercise, and apply it for short- and long-term
disability choices. The model makes specic assumptions about the form of the utility function,
about the expectations individuals have regarding their risks, and about the calibrated values of
additional parameters such as the discount rate, the (common) distribution of risk aversion across
individuals, and the nature of the risk realization processes. The results give rise to implied correla-
tion coe¢ cients between individualscoverage choices of short- and long-term disability insurances.
When we calibrate the average coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion in the sample to 3, we nd that
the correlation between short- and long-term disability insurance range from 0.18 to 0.55, depending
on the extent of correlation in risks we allows across domains. The range is somewhat larger (0.07
to 0.53) when we calibrate the average coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion to 0.7. These reported
ranges are just below the empirical correlation of about 0.6 for these two domains, as reported in
Table 3.
Such an exercise is suggestive that the correlation coe¢ cient we report in the data points to an
important domain-general component of risk preferences. In principle, the robustness of the result
could be probed with respect to the many underlying (strong) assumptions behind it. A more
important concern is that the exercise would still be using only two specic domains. Although in
principle, such an exercise could also be extended to additional domains, it is no coincidence that
we chose two of the most similar domains for this exercise, so that the natural models for coverage
choice were also quite similar
4.2 A Model
To extend the exercise to other domains and investigate robustness, we choose instead to pursue a
second approach, which is in some sense the mirror-image of what we have just described. Instead
of starting with a fully domain general model and asking what it would imply for the data, we
start instead with the data and ask, in the context of a given, stylized model of coverage choice,
what fraction of our samples choices can be rationalized with a single (individual-specic) risk
aversion coe¢ cient. Our modeling approach is guided by a desire to reduce although we cannot
of course eliminate domain-specic modeling assumptions. We therefore write down a stylized
model of coverage choice that is stripped of many domain-specic details. This framework allows
us to estimate the same generic model of primitives across the di¤erent contexts, which are quite
di¤erent from each other. As we shall see, a key decision in this respect is to follow the spirit of our
rst model free approach by focusing on the (narrower) question of comparing the consistency
of individuals ranking of risk aversion relative to their peers across contexts, rather than the
consistency of individuals level of risk aversion across contexts.
Consider a domain d and an individual i. We assume that choices are generated by expected
utility maximizers who have a domain-invariant vNM utility function over wealth, ui(w). Faced
with a set of coverage options Jd in each domain, individuals then evaluate their expected utility
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from each option j 2 Jd, denoted by vdij , by
vdij = Eec [ui (wi   doopj(ec)  pj)] ; (2)
where expectations are taken over the cost realization ec. In addition, wi is a measure of income or
wealth, oopj(ec) captures the out-of-pocket expenditure that is associated with a cost realization of ec
under coverage j, and pj denotes the premium associated with coverage option j. The parameter d,
which varies across domains but not across individuals, captures context-specic beliefs (or other
biases). That is, d = 1 can be thought of as correct expectations, while d < 1 (d > 1) implies
biased expectations about risk, which are too optimistic (pessimistic). In the context of the model,
d enters as biased beliefs, which could be driven by framing e¤ects or probability weighting. More
generally, however, one can think of d as a reduced formway by which we capture a variety of
potential domain-specic e¤ects. That is, all else equal, higher (lower) values of d require lower
(higher) levels of risk aversion to rationalize a given choice, thus providing a free parameter in each
domain that captures the level of risk aversion.
To evaluate the expectations for each individual, we abstract from unobservables that may
a¤ect ex ante risk, and assume that individualsrisk realization is drawn randomly from the risk
realizations of other individuals who are associated with the same group (e.g., based on demograph-
ics). That is, if individual i is associated with group N so that i 2 N , we evaluate individual is
expectations by
Eec [ui (wi   doopj(ec)  pj)] = 1jN jX
k2N
ui (wi   doopj(ck)  pj) : (3)
Equipped with this model, we can then assume a specic parametric utility function ui() for
each individual, such as CARA or CRRA, and map each choice into an interval of coe¢ cients of
risk aversion that would rationalize this choice. To see this, note that the set of coverage options
in all our domains are vertically ordered (see our discussion in Section 2), so the willingness to
pay for incremental coverage is monotone in risk aversion. Conditional on risk expectations, each
(discrete) coverage choice can be mapped into an interval of risk aversion parameters that would
rationalize the choice. Observing choices of the same individual across di¤erent domains, we can
now ask whether the intervals associated with these choices overlap. If the answer is positive, it
means that there exists a range of domain-general risk aversion coe¢ cients that could generate this
individuals choices across the di¤erent domains. We can then ask what fraction of individuals have
a range of risk aversion coe¢ cients that are consistent across a given set of contexts.
The conceptual approach is similar to the test proposed by Barseghyan et al. (forthcoming),
although our use of the ds parameters allow us to remain consistent with our model freeexercise
and focus on the consistency of the relative risk preferences of individuals across contexts rather
than on the consistency of their absolute levels. This focus likely makes the results less sensitive
to modeling assumptions by removing the need to make assumptions (e.g. about the level of risk
aversion or the nature of beliefs) as we did in the calibration exercise described above. While our
results could speak to the broader question about the consistency of an individuals level of risk
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aversion across contexts (and, indeed, we mention some such results below), one would naturally
worry that in order to infer the level of risk preferences, a richer domain-specic model of risk
realization, expectation formation, and coverage choice would be preferred.
4.3 Implementation and main results
Using this framework, our empirical exercise attempts to maximize the fraction of the individuals
in the sample for whom the implied intervals of risk aversion overlap across two or more domains.
We allow the vector of ds to be free parameters and search for the set of ds that maximize
the overlap. Our results have a simple economic interpretation. They represent the fraction of
individuals for whom the choices across domains could be rationalized with a single risk aversion
parameter, subject to domain-specic e¤ects (that do not vary across individuals). The estimated
ds (and, in particular, how far they are from 1) can then be interpreted as a measure of how much
domain-specic e¤ects is required to rationalize a single risk aversion.
Appendix B provides additional implementation details. To summarize, we assume a CARA
utility for the three domains associated with absolute (dollar) risk (health insurance, prescription
drug insurance, and dental insurance) and a CRRA utility for the three domains associated with
relative (to wage) risk (short- and long-term disability insurance, and 401(k) allocation). We use
  wi as a multiplicative factor that converts each individuals coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
to absolute risk aversion, where wi is (in the baseline specication) individual is observed annual
income, and  is an additional free parameter (constant across individuals), which maps annual
income to wealth. Other than for this conversion, wi drops out of the analysis. We search over this
additional parameter , in addition to the vector of ds, when we search for the maximum overlap.
Table 8 presents the results. Column (2) reports overlap results for all six domains. Column (3)
reports overlap results for the ve insurance domains. Columns (4) and (5) report results separately
for, respectively, the three domains associated with absolute (dollar) risk (health, dental, and drug
insurance) and the three domains associated with relative (to income) risk (short- and long-term
disability insurance, and 401(k) asset allocation).
Before presenting our baseline results of the maximum fraction of individuals whose implied risk
aversion intervals overlap, row 1 presents, as a starting point, the minimum fraction of individuals
whose implied risk aversion intervals overlap. This can be found by taking the maximum of the
fraction of individuals who choose the least risky options and the fraction of individuals who choose
the most risky option; with appropriate ds, the choices of individuals who always choose the least
risky options across domains (or the choices of individuals who always choose the most risky options
across domains) can always be rationalized. In our case, the minimum fraction of individuals whose
implied risk aversion intervals overlap is given by the fraction of individuals who choose the least
risky option in each domain. The rst row indicates that, by this metric, at least ve percent of
the sample can be mechanicallyviewed as consistent across all domains. This number increases
substantially, to 26 percent, once we limit the analysis to the ve insurance domains.
Row 2 reports the maximum overlap results for our baseline sample. It indicates that, across
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all six domains, 30 percent of the individuals have implied risk aversion intervals that overlap,
once we allow for the domain-specic free parameters (the ds). Interestingly, the ds required to
achieve this overlap are generally well below 1, which is consistent with individuals under-estimating
event probabilities. When we only search for overlap across the ve insurance domains, we nd
it to be 38 percent, and it is much higher when we only search for overlap separately across the
domains associated with absolute risk (56 percent) and relative risk (70 percent). Naturally, some
of this increase in overlap is mechanical, since removing domains (weakly) increases our ability to
rationalize the smaller number of choices.
As noted, our introduction of the domain-specic parameter d moves the spirit of the analysis
away from investigating consistency in an individuals implied level of risk aversion across domains
toward an analysis of the consistency in an individuals ranking (relative to their peers) of risk
aversion across domains. To investigate the importance of these domain-specic free parameters
for the results, row 3 shows the overlap of risk aversion intervals when we restrict all ds (as well
as ) to be equal to 1. We now nd that only 5.3 percent of the sample exhibits choices that
overlap in their implied risk aversion intervals. This suggests that the implied levels of risk aversion
exhibited may be very di¤erent across domains, or that other e¤ects, such as framing or probability
weighting, are particularly important in these contexts and di¤erent across domains.
Consistent with the model freecorrelation results, our analysis also suggests that the 401(k)
domain is the most di¤erent. One way to see this is in row 4, where we continue to restrict all ve
insurance-domainsds (as well as ) to be equal to 1, but free up the 401(k) parameter and search
for the value that maximizes the overlap. The results illustrate the importance of having a free
401(k) parameter, e¤ectively allowing for very di¤erent levels of risk aversion (or beliefs) in this
domain. We now obtain a maximum overlap of 28 percent, which is quite di¤erent from the overlap
of 5 percent when all six ds are restricted to be equal to 1, and quite close to the unconstrained
maximum overlap of 30 percent (row 2). In other words, allowing a free parameter on 401(k) gets
us almost all of the benet of allowing all six domains-specic free parameters.
4.4 Robustness
Somewhat parallel to our robustness analysis in Section 3, we explore the robustness of our model-
based results to a number of modeling choices. The results are reported in the subsequent rows of
Table 8 (rows 5-13). Overall, the results are reasonably stable across alternative specications and
subsamples.
As noted at the outset, our modeling choices  particularly the introduction of the domain
specic free parameters ds was aimed to capture, in a somewhat reduced form way, a wide
range of potential domain-specic factors. These include not only domain-specic biases in beliefs
or probability weighting functions but other potentially domain specic inuences such as the
appropriate discount rate, the planning horizon, or framing. As a result, an attractive feature
of our modeling approach is that there is a more limited number of domain-specic modeling
assumptions with respect to which sensitivity analysis need be evaluated.
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However, one domain-specic factor that might contribute to the apparent di¤erence of the
401(k) domain is that the 401(k) choice is continuous, rather than discrete. Reassuringly, row 5
shows that this is unlikely to be important. In particular, we discretize the 401(k) asset allocation
decision into three choices (with roughly 40 percent, 16 percent, and 44 percent respectively):
contribute nothing to the risk-free funds, contribute everything to the risk-free funds, and contribute
in between. For people in this last group, we assign the average contribution share to the risk-free
funds among people in this group, which is about 35 percent. The results are indistinguishable
from the baseline.
A potentially important modeling choice is the use of CARA utility for three domains and
CRRA for the other three, and the free parameter  that is used to convert between them. For
this reason, in all rows we have shown results separately for the CARA and CRRA domains (in
columns (4) and (5)). We also explored the importance of the free parameter  in our conversion
between coe¢ cients of absolute and relative risk aversion. Row 6 shows that constraining this 
parameter to be 1 has little e¤ect on the results. Row 7 uses an alternative denition of wi when
we use  wi to convert between each individuals coe¢ cient of relative and absolute risk aversion.
Specically, instead of dening wi as annual income, in row 8 we take account of the individuals
401(k) assets (and the implicit income they generate) by dening wi as annual income plus ve
percent of the individuals 401(k) balance. Once again this does not a¤ect the results.
Finally, as noted in our discussion of the model freecorrelation results in the previous section,
an important concern with our analysis particularly for the 401(k) asset allocation decision is
that we do not observe the individuals non-401(k) assets. We therefore subject our model results
to the same two types of robustness exercises we performed in Section 3 (see Table 6 in particular).
Specically, we rst try to proxy for (and stratify on) housing wealth. For the one third of the
sample we were able to obtain housing equity data for, row 8 shows that we estimate a maximum
overlap of 29 percent, which is virtually identical to our baseline estimate of 30 percent. This overlap
decreases slightly with housing equity (rows 9 to 11); for example, for all domains (column 2) the
maximum overlap declines from 32 percent for those with less than $50,000 in housing equity to
25 percent for those with more than $150,000 in housing equity. Overall, however, the correlations
for strata of individuals with similar housing wealth look very much like the results for the full
sample; we interpret these results as suggesting that our estimates are not that sensitive to our lack
of data on housing investments. In rows 12 and 13 we compare the overlap across the subsample
of employees who do not max out their 401(k) contributions and therefore are less likely to have
outside savings and the subsample who does. Once again results by strata are very similar to the
baseline results.
More generally, across all our various robustness analyses in rows 5 through 13 the maximum
fraction of individuals whose implied risk aversion intervals overlap is quite stable, ranging from
25 to 36 percent. The key decision quantitatively appears to be to allow for a domain-specic
level of risk aversion in the 401(k) asset allocation (see row 3 and 4); without this the overlap falls
considerably.
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5 Conclusion
This paper investigated the extent to which individuals display a stable ranking in their risk pref-
erences relative to their peers in making market choices over ve health-related employer-provided
insurance coverage decisions and their 401(k) asset allocation decisions. Our setting has the at-
traction that the decisions are all over purely nancial risk, the choices within each domain are
easily vertically rankable in terms of risk exposure, and the domains involve risks of similar and
non-trivial magnitudes.
An important portion of the paper has tried to develop useful benchmarks which would allow
us to gauge the magnitude of any domain-general component of preferences. The most natural and
informative benchmark involved greater modeling assumptions, but the results appear to be quite
robust. This in part reects our strategy of investigating the stability of willingness to take risks
relative to ones peers across di¤erent domains, rather than the extent to which risk aversion levels
are stable across domains. Of course, this choice is not without costs, as it sets a lower hurdle
for domain-generality of preferences; in a canonical domain-general model of risk aversion, an
individuals level of risk aversion would presumably also be constant across contexts.
We reject the null hypothesis that there is no domain general component to preferences and,
more interestingly, we nd that the extent of the domain-general component appears to be substan-
tively important. For example, we nd that ones choices in other insurance domains have about
four times more predictive power for ones choice in a given insurance domain than do a rich set of
demographic variables. The results from our stylized coverage choice model suggest that up to 30
percent of our sample makes choices that may be consistent across all six domains.
On the other hand, we also nd evidence of non-trivial context specicity. In particular, we
nd that the riskiness of ones 401(k) asset allocation decisions has considerably less predictive
power for ones insurance choices than do other insurance choices (or demographics). Results from
the stylized coverage choice model also suggest that choices in the 401(k) domain are the most
di¢ cult to reconcile with any of the others. More generally, even within the insurance domains we
nd a higher correlation in choices that are closerin context (such as health insurance and drug
insurance, or short-term and long-term disability insurance) than ones that are further apart (such
as health insurance and disability insurance).
These ndings suggest that the extent of domain generality may vary greatly across domains
that are more or less similarto each other. It would be of great interest in future work to examine
the extent of domain generality in more disparate domains than those we currently examine which
consisted of ve health-related insurance domains and one retirement investment domain. Beyond
the data hurdles, however, there is an inherent tension in such an exercise. The more di¤erent the
domains, the more di¢ cult it is to model and compare consumer choices in a domain-general way.
We hope that the approaches outlined here will prove useful in this regard as future work expands
to consider a greater set of possibly more disparate domains.
In the meantime, our results may have some implications for current calibration exercises.
Calibration work is ubiquitous in the elds of insurance, public nance, and macroeconomics.
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The vast majority of this work (including our own past work) attempts to calibrate models using
consensusparameter estimates (or ranges of estimates) from the literature at large rather than
estimates from more similar contexts. The results presented here may suggest that when calibrating
models of economic behavior  insurance demand, savings, labor supply, and so on one might
want to consider using preference estimates taken from similar contexts.
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Table 1: Employee characteristics in baseline sample
Mean Std. Dev. 5th pctile 95th pctile
Panel A: Demographics
Age 43.9 9.2 28 58
Annual wage (000$) 58.4 71.7 25.6 114
Job tenure with Alcoa (years) 13.2 9.6 1 30
Female 0.23
White 0.85
Hourly (non-salary) employee 0.32
Unionized employee 0.02
Single coverage tiera 0.19
Number of covered individuals per employeea 2.92 1.46 1 5
Panel B: Annual Payouts by domain
Health insurance claims ($) 5,221.4 10,606.8 60.3 18,091.7
Prescription drug insurance claims ($) 1,491.8 2,162.2 0.0 5,507.3
Dental insurance claims ($) 781.3 837.3 0.0 2,443.0
Short-term disability insurance (fraction with any claims)b 0.061
Long-term disability insurance (fraction with any claims)c 0.002
Annual 401(k) contribution ($) 4,616.2 3,199.5 709.6 11,225.8
The table is based on the 12,752 employees who constitute our baseline sample.
a The coverage tier and covered individuals are based on the medical coverage choices; we view them as reasonable
proxies for family size and structure.
b Conditional on having a short-term disability claim, the average claim length is 51 days.
c Conditional on having a long-term disability claim, the average claim length in our data is 345. However, the
long-term claim data is truncated at about two years, so 345 should be viewed as a lower bound.
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Table 2: Summary of benet options
Share Premium saving relativeto safest option
Expected incremental
cost
Std. Dev. Of
incremental cost
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Health Insurance
Option 1 17.3% 1,016.6 1,415.6 1,052.4
Option 2 1.3% 747.7 880.0 559.7
Option 3 2.7% 545.3 645.6 380.8
Option 4 26.3% 325.0 350.8 173.4
Option 5 52.4%
Prescription Drug Insurance
Option 1 23.8% 181.2 248.6 385.0
Option 2 9.7% 109.6 124.3 192.5
Option 3 66.4%
Dental Insurance
Option 1 30.0% 95.7 45.2 112.9
Option 2 70.0%
Short-Term Disability Insurancea
Option 1 15.5% 165.1 140.2 825.7
Option 2 17.9% 63.5 70.3 413.4
Option 3 66.6%
Long-Term Disability Insurancea
Option 1 16.3% 152.4 17.0 395.7
Option 2 14.9% 63.5 8.5 197.9
Option 3 68.8%
401(k) allocationb
Risk-free 0% 40.6% -- -421.7 514.0
Risk-free 0-25% 19.9% --
Risk-free 25-50% 12.8% --
Risk-free 50-75% 6.5% -- -210.8 257.0
Risk-free 75-100% 3.4% --
Risk-free 100% 16.8% --
All options are shown in the ordinal ranking from more (option 1) to less risk exposure (with the possible exception of
health insurance option 1; see text and Appendix Tables A1 and A2 for details). Column (1) shows the fraction who
chose each option in our baseline sample. Column (2) shows the average (in the baseline sample) premium savings
from choosing a given option relative to choosing the safest (least risk exposure) option; these vary across employees
based on benet menu, coverage tier (for health, drug and dental), and wages (for short- and long-term disability).
Columns (3) and (4) show, respectively, the average and standard deviation of the incremental cost that the insurer
would face (counterfactually for most of the sample) in covering our baseline sample of employees, given the realized
spending and coverage tier choices, with the safest option (i.e., the highest numbered option) relative to the option
shown.
a Short-term and long-term disability benets (columns (3), and (4)) and premiums (column (2)) are proportional
to the employees wage.
b For 401(k), columns (3) and (4) report expected incremental dollar payout (and associated standard deviation) for
0% vs. 100% in risk-free asset (rst row) and 50% vs. 100% in risk-free asset (second row) assuming the average
annual employee contribution in our baseline sample of $4,616. For the risky investment portfolio, we assumed the
allocation across di¤erent risky funds observed in the baseline sample, and similarly for the risk free part of the
investment portfolio (see Table A2).
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Table 3(a): Correlation estimates, without controls
Health Drug Dental STD LTD
Drug 0.400
Dental 0.242 0.275
STD 0.226 0.210 0.179
LTD 0.180 0.199 0.173 0.593
401(k) 0.057 0.061 0.036 0.029 0.028
(0.002) (0.002)
Average correlation is 0.192
Health Drug Dental STD LTD
Drug 0.550
Dental 0.339 0.410
STD 0.292 0.303 0.271
LTD 0.243 0.298 0.266 0.768
401(k) 0.055 0.071 0.046 0.032 0.020
(0.004) (0.069)
Average correlation is 0.264
Health Drug Dental STD LTD
Drug 0.452
Dental 0.238 0.267
STD 0.188 0.197 0.169
LTD 0.155 0.191 0.165 0.600
401(k) 0.057 0.056 0.035 0.029 0.018
(0.001) (0.042)
Average correlation is 0.188
Panel A: Spearman rank correlations
Panel B: Correlation estimates from a system of ordered probits
Panel C: Correlation estimates from a multivariate regression
The table reports results for our baseline sample of 12,752 employees. Unless reported otherwise in parentheses,
the p-values associated with whether the correlation coe¢ cient is di¤erent from zero are all less than 0.001. Each
cell reports a pairwise correlation. The average correlation is simply the average of the fteen pairwise correlations
shown, and is provided only as a single summary number. Panel A reports Spearman rank correlations. Panel B
shows results from a system of ve ordered probits and one linear regression for the 401(k) domain (see text for more
details). Panel C reports the correlation structure from the multivariate regression shown in equation (1). Both Panel
B and Panel C include control (indicator) variables for the benet menu the employee faces; for Panel B, we exclude
all menus that were o¤ered to fewer than 100 people, reducing the sample size by 86 employees.
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Table 3(b): Correlation estimates, controlling for predictors of risks
Health Drug Dental STD LTD
Drug 0.494
Dental 0.302 0.409
STD 0.249 0.245 0.258
LTD 0.210 0.250 0.255 0.764
401(k) 0.036 0.043 0.037 -0.005 -0.006
(0.001) (0.003) (0.644) (0.562)
Average correlation is 0.234
Health Drug Dental STD LTD
Drug 0.411
Dental 0.208 0.250
STD 0.155 0.156 0.156
LTD 0.130 0.157 0.153 0.593
401(k) 0.038 0.032 0.026 0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.859) (0.825)
Average correlation is 0.164
Panel A: Correlation estimates from a system of ordered probits
Panel B: Correlation estimates from a multivariate regression
The reports results for our baseline sample of 12,752 employees. Panels A and B are analogous to Panels B and C
in Table 3(a), respectively. The results reported in this table include additional eleven control variables for predicted
and realized risk in each equation. These attempt to control for heterogeneous risk expectations across individuals,
which may be correlated across domains. See the text (Section 3.1) for additional details. As in Table 3(a), both
panels include also control (indicator) variables for the benet menu the employee faces; for Panel A, we exclude all
menus that were o¤ered to fewer than 100 people, reducing the sample size by 86 employees.
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Table 4(a): Summary correlations by groups, ordered probit specication
Obs. Averagecorrelation
Health-Drug
correlation
Health-STD
correlation
Health-401(k)
correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Single coverage 2420 0.309 0.643 0.379 0.082
Non single 10246 0.251 0.517 0.267 0.052
More tenured 11641 0.262 0.547 0.287 0.058
Newly hired 1025 0.269 0.569 0.289 0.012
Higher wage 3145 0.240 0.524 0.198 0.078
Lower wage 3126 0.246 0.534 0.336 0.029
Don't allocate to Alcoa Stock 7241 0.272 0.548 0.300 0.066
Allocate to Alcoa stock 5245 0.252 0.552 0.277 0.036
Rebalance 401(k) portfolio 3610 0.261 0.551 0.264 0.080
Don't rebalance 9056 0.266 0.551 0.302 0.047
Over 55 years old 1690 0.248 0.595 0.251 0.062
Under 35 years old 2550 0.276 0.539 0.326 0.032
Salaried employees 8594 0.256 0.541 0.256 0.068
Hourly employees 4072 0.247 0.542 0.326 0.014
(7)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
The table reports the correlation coe¢ cients for the subsamples specied in the row headers. The estimates all use
Panel B of Table 3(a) as a baseline. That is, we report the correlation structure of the residuals from estimating
the system of ordered probit equations (with a single linear equation for 401(k) choice), with covariates for benet
menu xed e¤ects. The average correlation in column (2) is the simple average across the fteen possible pairs of
correlations (as in the bottom of each panel of Table 3), while the other columns report the pairwise correlations for
the selected pairs shown in the column headings. Row 1 divides the sample by single coverage tier for health and
drug vs. all other (non-single) coverage tiers. Row 2 separates out newly hired employees (dened as less than 2 years
of tenure) from higher tenured employees. Row 3 separately examines employees with greater than $72,000 annual
wages and less than $36,000 annual wages (approximately the top and bottom quartiles of wages). Row 4 separates
employees who did and did not allocate their own 401(k) contributions to Alcoa stock. Row 5 separates employees
who did (at least once) and did not rebalance their 401(k) portfolio during the year.
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Table 4(b): Summary correlations by groups, multivariate regression
Obs. Averagecorrelation
Health-Drug
correlation
Health-STD
correlation
Health-401(k)
correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Single coverage 2441 0.224 0.532 0.252 0.074
Non single 10311 0.176 0.421 0.167 0.055
More tenured 11708 0.185 0.448 0.184 0.059
Newly hired 1044 0.195 0.472 0.184 0.023
Higher wage 3151 0.178 0.425 0.146 0.072
Lower wage 3173 0.162 0.439 0.174 0.026
Don't allocate to Alcoa Stock 7468 0.193 0.448 0.195 0.073
Allocate to Alcoa stock 5284 0.180 0.456 0.176 0.033
Rebalance 401(k) portfolio 3626 0.186 0.430 0.178 0.079
Don't rebalance 9126 0.188 0.460 0.190 0.049
Over 55 years old 1700 0.167 0.446 0.147 0.061
Under 35 years old 2568 0.199 0.447 0.209 0.031
Salaried employees 8644 0.187 0.442 0.175 0.069
Hourly employees 4108 0.157 0.453 0.170 0.016
(7)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
The table fully parallels Table 4(a), except that it uses the residuals from estimating the multivariate regression
specication (Panel C of Table 3(a)), as shown in equation (1), as a baseline.
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Table 5: Robustness I Alternative specications and samples denitions
Obs. Averagecorrelation
Health-Drug
correlation
Health-STD
correlation
Health-401(k)
correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. A system of ordered probits
1 Baseline specification 12,666 0.264 0.55 0.292 0.055
2 Discretizing the 401(k) choice 12,666 0.260 0.550 0.292 0.050
3 Control for coverage tier 12,666 0.264 0.546 0.292 0.056
4 Use only the largest pricing menu 7,722 0.268 0.552 0.277 0.067
5 Include those in opt-out and HMO 15,399 0.230a -- -- --
6 Include employees who did not contribute to 401(k) 15,344 0.368b 0.540 0.295 --
7 Include those not offered LTD coverage 15,570 0.230c 0.540 0.292 0.052
8 Exclude those in Health Option 1 (due to HRA component) 10,473 0.223 0.317 0.280 0.009
9 Include only new hires 1,025 0.269 0.569 0.289 0.012
10 Exclude individuals who may have chosen default options 11,243 0.279 0.627 0.328 0.067
Panel B. Multivariate regressions
1 Baseline specification 12,752 0.188 0.452 0.188 0.057
2 Discretizing the 401(k) choice 12,752 0.184 0.452 0.188 0.045
3 Control for coverage tier 12,752 0.186 0.447 0.187 0.058
4 Use only the largest pricing menu 7,722 0.195 0.452 0.191 0.069
5 Include those in opt-out and HMO 15,409 0.165a -- -- --
6 Include employees who did not contribute to 401(k) 15,402 0.257b 0.446 0.184 --
7 Include those not offered LTD coverage 15,675 0.162c 0.442 0.183 0.052
8 Exclude those in Health Option 1 (due to HRA component) 10,547 0.147 0.226 0.175 0.009
9 Include only new hires 1,044 0.195 0.472 0.184 0.023
10 Exclude individuals who may have chosen default options 11,323 0.191 0.460 0.197 0.059
This table reports correlation results for variants of the baseline specication. Analogously to Table 3(a), Panels B
and C respectively, Panel A uses the system of ordered probits and Panel B uses multivariate regressions. Column
(2) shows the simple average of the 15 pairwise correlations, and columns (3) through (5) report correlations for
specic pairs. For ease of comparison, row 1 replicates the baseline specication from Table 3(a). Each row shows
a single deviation from the baseline specication. Row 2 replaces the continuous 401(k) measure with a discretized
ordinal measure ranging from 1 to 3, row 3 includes coverage tier (based on health coverage) xed e¤ects, and row
4 reports results using the largest (modal) benet menu (and therefore does not require menu xed e¤ects). Rows
5-10 report results from alternative samples. In rows 5, 6, and 7 we include employees that were excluded from
the baseline sample, and in these cases we omit the domain that had disqualied these employees from the baseline
sample. Therefore, the average correlations in these cases are not directly comparable to the baseline specication,
although the individual pairs are. In row 9 we limit the sample to new hires (dened as job tenure at Alcoa of less
than two years). In row 10 we exclude the approximately 10% of the employees whose choices are fully consistent
with the default options in all insurance domains, and are therefore potentially passivechoosers.
a The comparable average correlation (that is, over the 6 pairs that do not include health and drug coverage) in the
baseline specication is 0.234 (Panel A) and 0.169 (Panel B).
b The analogous average correlation (that is, over the 10 pairs that do not include 401(k) choices) in the baseline
specication is 0.374 (Panel A) and 0.262 (Panel B).
c The analogous average correlation (that is, over the 10 pairs that do not include long-term disability coverage) in
the baseline specication is 0.237 (Panel A) and 0.169 (Panel B).
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Table 6: Robustness II Non-Alcoa investments
Obs. Averagecorrelation
Health-Drug
correlation
Health-STD
correlation
Health-401(k)
correlation
Drug-401(k)
correlation
Dental-401(k)
correlation
STD-401(k)
correlation
LTD-401(k)
correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A. A system of ordered probits
1 Baseline specification 12,666 0.264 0.55 0.292 0.055 0.071 0.046 0.032 0.02
2 Housing Subsample 4,278 0.271 0.541 0.298 0.049 0.088 0.055 0.009 0.007
3 House Equity < $50,000 1,362 0.282 0.502 0.343 0.027 0.087 0.091 0.005 0.015
4 Housing Equity $50,000-$150,000 1,523 0.282 0.592 0.306 0.058 0.074 0.001 0.018 0.014
5 Housing Equity > $150,000 1,355 0.253 0.514 0.239 0.065 0.104 0.081 0.019 -0.004
6 Maxed out 401(k) contributions 1,731 0.288 0.608 0.305 0.114 0.071 0.036 0.011 0.004
7 Did not max out 401(k) contributions 10,935 0.258 0.539 0.285 0.044 0.070 0.046 0.032 0.023
Panel B. Multivariate regressions
1 Baseline specification 12,752 0.188 0.452 0.188 0.057 0.056 0.035 0.029 0.018
2 Housing Subsample 4,309 0.195 0.441 0.203 0.051 0.070 0.041 0.016 0.012
3 House Equity < $50,000 1,399 0.202 0.410 0.229 0.042 0.075 0.072 0.016 0.017
4 Housing Equity $50,000-$150,000 1,544 0.199 0.488 0.211 0.049 0.052 0.000 0.013 0.014
5 Housing Equity > $150,000 1,366 0.184 0.417 0.167 0.066 0.083 0.061 0.022 0.003
6 Maxed out 401(k) contributions 1,740 0.212 0.499 0.225 0.089 0.049 0.030 0.016 0.004
7 Did not max out 401(k) contributions 11,012 0.181 0.441 0.176 0.050 0.056 0.034 0.029 0.020
This table reports correlation results for various subsamples. Analogously to Table 3(a), Panels B and C respectively,
Panel A uses the system of ordered probits and Panel B uses multivariate regressions. Column (2) shows the simple
average of the 15 pairwise correlations, and columns (3) through (9) report correlations for specic pairs. For ease of
comparison, row 1 replicates the baseline specication from Table 3(a). Row 2 presents the results for approximately
one-third of the sample for which we were able to match data on their housing equity. Rows 3 through 5 present
results for various subsamples of this housing subsample,as indicated. Rows 6 and 7 present results separately for
individuals who have maxed out their possible 401(k) contributions and those who have not.
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Table 7: Predictive power of di¤erent variables
Regressors
Health Drug Dental STD LTD 401(k)
Choices in other domains 0.227 0.243 0.102 0.374 0.368 0.004
Predicted and realized risk 0.070 0.107 0.056 0.043 0.023 0.024
Demographics 0.037 0.044 0.025 0.039 0.033 0.043
Choices in less related domains 0.082 0.102 0.077 0.063 0.054 0.004
All of the above 0.247 0.292 0.144 0.394 0.378 0.046
Dependent variable
Each entry in the table reports the adjusted R2 from a separate OLS regression of the dependent variable shown in
the column heading. In all regressions, the dependent variable is the enumerated coverage choice in the domain given
by the column header, after partialing out benet menu xed e¤ects. The regressors are given by the row header.
Choices in other domains contain the vector of the enumerated choices in all ve other domains. Predicted and
realized riskrefers to a vector of both predicted and realized risks in all domains (see Section 3.1 for more details).
Choices in less related domainsomits the other choice which is most correlated with the dependent variable (Drug
in Health and Health in Drug, Drug in Dental, LTD in STD and STD in LTD, Health in 401(k)). Demographics
consist of age, age squared, dummy variables for gender, race, and employee type (hourly or salary), job tenure in
Alcoa, annual wage, and a dummy for single coverage tier (as a proxy for family composition).
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Table 8: Model-based results
Obs. All domains All insurancedomains
Three CARA
domains
Three CRRA
domains
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 Minimum overlap 11,898 5% 26% 35% 10%
2 Baseline specification 11,898 30% 38% 56% 70%
3 Restricted: l = g = 1 11,898 5% 31% 44% 14%
4 Restricted: flexible l only on 401(k); g = 1 11,898 28% -- -- 61%
Alternative specifications:
5 Discretize 401(k) 11,898 30% -- -- 70%
6 Restricted:  g  = 1 11,898 30% 36% -- --
7 Alternative definition of income 11,898 30% 38% -- --
Alternative samples:
8 Housing Subsample 4,054 29% 35% 56% 68%
9 House Equity < $50,000 1,305 32% 38% 57% 70%
10 Housing Equity $50,000-$150,000 1,453 30% 36% 57% 69%
11 Housing Equity > $150,000 1,296 25% 32% 54% 64%
12 Maxed out 401k contributions 9,394 29% 35% 55% 69%
13 Did not max out 401k contributions 2,504 36% 44% 62% 71%
This table reports results from the exercise described in Section 4 (and in additional detail in Appendix B). Each
entry in columns (2) through (5) represents our estimate of the fraction of individuals whose entire vector of choices
(as given by the column header) could be rationalized given the analogous specication (as given by the row header).
Specically, column (2) reports the fraction of individuals whose estimated ranges of risk aversion in each domain
overlap across all six domains; column (3) reports the fraction with overlap across the ve insurance domains (that
is, not including 401(k) allocation), column (4) reports the fraction with overlap across the three domains associated
with absolute risk (health, drug, and dental), and column (5) reports the fraction with overlap across the three
relative risk domains (short- and long-term disability, and 401(k) allocation).
Each row reports a di¤erent specication. The rst row report the minimum fraction of individuals with overlap in
their risk aversion ranges; this is the fraction of individuals who always choose the least risky option in each domain.
The second row reports our baseline specication, as described in the text. All other rows report variants of the
baseline, each with a single deviation from the baseline as described. In row 3 we constrain all six ds and  to be 1.
In row 4 we restrict  and ve of the ds to be 1 but free up the 401(k) parameter. In row 5 we discretize the 401(k)
asset allocation decision into three choices: invest nothing in the risk-free asset, invest all in the risk-free asset, or in
between, which we parameterize based on the average risk free share (35 percent) of those in this category. In row
6 we restrict  to be 1. In row 7 we dene income (used to convert between each individuals coe¢ cient of relative
and absolute risk aversion) as annual income plus 5 percent of 401(k) balances, instead of as annual income as in the
baseline specication. Rows 8 through 13 reports results from the baseline specication using various subsamples of
our population. Specically, in row 8 we limit the results to the sample for whom we were able to link in data on
housing wealth. Rows 9 through 11 show results stratied by housing equity level. Rows 12 and 13 split the sample
between those who have contributed the maximum possible amount to their 401(k) and those who have not maxed
out their possible 401(k) contributions.
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Appendix A: A calibrated model of short-term and long-term disability insurance
choices.
In this appendix we describe the details of the calibration exercise on which we report in the beginning
of Section 4. The objective of the calibration exercise is to illustrate how one could produce a benchmark for
the correlation coe¢ cients that would be produced if the data were generated by a model with completely
domain-general risk preferences, but were subject to the non-linearities and discreteness transformations
that arise from the ordinal coverage choice data. We focus on short- and long-term disability, which are
the domains that are most similar to each other in their structure of choices and risks. This allows us to
rely on a single choice model for both domains, rather than on a domain-specic model. We estimate the
correlation in the simulated choices between the modal short-term disability menu (of 60%, 80%, and 100%
replacement rates) and the modal long-term disability menu (of 50%, 60%, and 70% replacement rates),
using the observed prices.
Our calibration exercise assumes a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) per-period utility function,
whereby the expected utility from a given disability insurance contract j (which species a given wage
replacement rate and is associated with a given annual premium) is
Eu (c) = E ~d

1  ~d+RRj  ed  pj1  ; (4)
where ed is the (ex-ante random) fraction of days in a year the employee claims (due to disability), RRj is
the wage replacement rate associated with coverage j; the premium pj is measured per dollar of (annual)
wage, and  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. The individual is maximizing expected utility over
the duration under consideration, which we assume to be one year for short-term disability and four years
for long-term disability (as after about four years, our claim data is truncated, although only few disability
claims in the data remain active that long). We assume an annual discount factor of .95 for long-term
disability.
We assume that the distribution of  in the population to be lognormal with parameters  and ,
such that the values of  and  are chosen to produce an average relative risk aversion coe¢ cient of 3 or
0.7 (depending on the specication) and a coe¢ cient of variation of risk aversion of 10. The coe¢ cient
of variation (of 10) matches the estimates reported by Cohen and Einav (2007). Cohen and Einav (2007)
mention higher numbers of relative risk aversion, but they essentially estimate absolute risk aversion, so
mapping it to this lower levels of relative risk aversion amounts to simply assuming lower relevant wealth
(the simulated correlations remain about the same when we instead use an average coe¢ cient of risk aversion
of 30, and maintain the same coe¢ cient of variation). To calibrate the distribution of risk (missed days),
we use the risk realization of short- and long-term disability in the data to dene eight risk groups based on
demographics (using all combinations of gender, race, and employment status indicators), which produces a
fairly large heterogeneity in ex ante risk across individuals. We assume a sample size identical to our baseline
sample (12,752) and for each individual in the calibrated sample we draw a risk aversion coe¢ cient from the
distribution of , assume that he or she knows the distribution of risks for his or her risk group, and compute
the optimal coverage choice from the o¤ered menus of short- and long-term disability coverage.
Using this model we simulated choices from the modal short- and long-term disability menus o¤ered in
the data, and correlated these choices with each other.
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Appendix B: Implementation details for the model-based approach of Section 4
This appendix provides additional details that underlie the baseline exercise reported in Section 4 (and
Table 8).
Health, Dental, and Drug coverage. The risks in these three domains are measured in dollars. There-
fore, for our baseline estimates, we assume a CARA utility function in these domains. That is, we use equation
(3) to compute individual is expected utility from option j by substituting ui(x) =   exp ( rix), incorpo-
rating the plan details (regarding deductible and out-of-pocket maximum) to compute oopj(c), and grouping
individuals into risk categories by their coverage tier (single coverage, employee plus spouse, employee plus
children, and family coverage) and randomly drawing from individualsrealization of total medical expendi-
ture c.
Short-term and Long-term disability coverage. The risks (and premiums) in these domains are all
proportional to the employees (annual) wage. It is therefore natural to assume a CRRA utility function for
these two domains. Again, we use equation (3) to compute individual is expected utility from option j by
substituting ui(x) = x
1 i , assuming all individuals are grouped at the same risk, drawing the claimed dis-
ability days for each individual, and computing oopj(d) = (1 RRj)d where RRj is the wage replacement
rate associated with coverage j. A minor complication arises in the case of long-term disability coverage,
where the data on realized risks is slightly censored (for long spells of disability absence), so we impute the
full predicted absence based on the observed propensity to remain on (long-term) disability between the rst
and second year.
Determining cuto¤s and dening intervals. Given a value of d for domain d with J options, we par-
tition [0;1] into J intervals [r1 (d) = 0; r2 (d)], ..., [rk (d) ; rk+1 (d)], ..., [rJ (d) ; rJ+1 (d) =1],
such that an individual with a given distribution of risk and a risk aversion parameter in interval [rk (d) ; rk+1 (d)]
will choose option k. For a given d, a menu of options and distribution of risk, we rst nd the level of risk
aversion rk;k+1 (d) such that an individual is indi¤erent between choices k and k + 1; where option k + 1
has the higher premium and higher coverage. There are a couple of cases to bear in mind:
 If a risk neutral individual prefers option k + 1 over option k then option k is dominated and choice
k + 1 cannot be rationalized. In such a case, some of the intervals will be empty.
 For lower values of lambda, the risk might be small enough that option k should never be chosen. In
the limit, if  = 0, then only the lowest coverage option can be rationalized, and again some of the
intervals are empty.
 For all other cases, we can nd a cuto¤ value such that an individual faced with option k and k + 1
will choose option k for r < rk;k+1, and option k + 1 if r > rk;k+1.
Using the procedure described above, we compute J(J   1)=2 cuto¤ values for each pair of options,
which dene the relevant intervals of risk aversion implied by each coverage choice in the data.
401(k) choice. Here, because the decision is continuous, we slightly deviate from the description provided
in the paper, and instead rely on the same exercise performed in the seminal paper of Friend and Blume
40
(1975). As they show, one can convert ones share invested in a risky asset i to ones coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion i, by applying i =
1
i
E(rm rf)
2m
. Our inclusion of a domain-specic adjustment 401(k)
simply implies that 401(k) multiplies the right-hand-side, illustrating how this manipulation frees up the
level of risk aversion. We use the average return of the safe funds to compute the (monthly) risk free return
E (rf )= 0:0036. We aggregate all the funds in our sample invested in the risky funds to compute an
estimate of the expected (monthly) return of the riskyasset and its standard deviation, which are given by
E (rm)= 0:0103 and m= 0:0285. Taken together, this implies that
E(rm rf)
2m
= 8:35. We further assume
that people who invest all their 401(k) contributions in the risky funds are at a corner solution, implying
that for such individuals we obtain that i2

0; 401(k)
E(rm rf)
2m

.
Conversion between absolute and relative risk aversion. For each individual we have three intervals
for their value of absolute risk aversion, based on their health, dental, and drug coverage choice, and three
intervals (or a point in some cases for 401(k)) for the value of their relative risk aversion from short-term and
long-term disability coverage and their 401(k) allocation. To evaluate the consistency of choices across all
six domains, we need to convert the absolute risk aversion intervals to relative-risk aversion. We use another
free parameter  (which could be interpreted as converting annual income to wealth), as well as the data
on the individuals annual income, such that RRA = ARA wage , where RRA and ARA are the
coe¢ cients of relative and absolute risk aversion, respectively.
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Appendix Table A1: Coverage Details for Insurance Plans
Summary of Key Coverage Details Additional details
(1) (2)
Health Insurancea Deductible (In-network / out-of-network)
Option 1b 3,000 /  6,000
Option 2 1,500 /  3,000
Option 3 1,000 /  2,000
Option 4 500 /  1,000
Option 5 0 /  500
Prescription Drug Insurance Cost sharing for branded drugs (retail / mail order)
Option 1 50%  /  40%
Option 2 40%  /  30%
Option 3 30% / 20%
Dental Insurance Per person Deductible / Maximum annual benefit
Option 1 50  /  1000
Option 2 25  /  2000
Short-Term Disability Insurancec Wage replacement rate
Option 1 mostly 60% (sometimes 40%)
Option 2 mostly 80% (sometimes 60%)
Option 3 mostly 100% (sometimes 80%)
Long-Term Disability Insurancec Replacement rate
Option 1 mostly 50%
Option 2 mostly 60%
Option 3 mostly 70%
After satisfying the annual deductible, cost sharing is 10% in-network and 30% out-of-network
for all options. All options also specify in-network and out-of-network out-of-pocket
maximums, but these are rarely binding. Preventive care is covered in full under all coverage
options.
Salary workers have 100% replacement rate for first two weeks of disability under all options;
all options provide up to 26 weeks of benefits.
All long-term disability coverage is payable after 26 weeks of disability (when the shirt-term
disability coverage is capped).
The family deductible is double the per-person amount. Both plans fully cover preventative
care, provide identical coverage for other special treatments. Oral surgery is covered at 50%
under option 1 and 100% under option 2. Orthodontia is not covered under option 1 and is
covered at 50% under option 2.
All options have cost-sharing of 10% for generic (non-branded) mail order drugs and 20% for
generic retail drugs. All options have a $50 deductible ($100 for family) and a $50 ($100 for
mail-order) maximum per prescription.
All options are shown in the ordinal ranking from more (option 1) to less risk exposure (with the possible exception
of health insurance option 1; see note b and text for details). Column (1) summarizes key features of each option.
Column (2) provides additional details.
a Health insurance: deductibles are shown for the non-single coverage tier; deductibles for single coverage are half
what is shown.
b Option 1 includes a Health Reimbursement Account (HRA) in which Alcoa contributes $1,250 in tax free money
each year that the employee can used to fund eligible out of pocket health care expenses. Any balance remaining at
the end of the year can be rolled over to pay for future out of pocket costs. See text for more details.
c Short-term and Long-term disability benets (column (1)) are proportional to the employees wage.
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Appendix Table A2: List of funds available for 401(k) allocation
Fund name (Asset Class)
Sharea Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Classified (by us) as "Risk Free":
GIC/Stable Value (Fixed Income) 24.47% 0.35 0.02 0.31 0.37
Vanguard Total Bond 3.95% 0.42 0.83 -1.09 1.92
All other classified as risky:
American Balanced (Balanced Equity) 10.58% 0.65 1.36 -2.34 2.89
Inv. Co. of America (Large Cap US Equity) 9.62% 0.83 1.84 -3.82 3.86
AMCAP (Large US Equity) 6.77% 0.66 2.06 -4.19 4.01
Vanguard Institutional Index (Large Cap US Equity) 9.42% 0.79 2.21 -4.18 4.43
MSDW International Equity 4.09% 1.25 2.32 -3.30 4.92
New Perspective (International Equity) 5.34% 1.49 2.72 -4.13 6.32
Putnam OTC (Mid Cap US Equity) 3.23% 1.01 3.40 -6.35 7.45
Small Cap Core (Small Cap US Equity) 0.30% 0.29 3.44 -6.95 7.90
Putnam Vista (Mid Cap US Equity) 3.71% 0.56 3.55 -8.58 6.75
MSDW Emerging Markets 2.62% 3.13 5.83 -11.69 15.03
Company (Alcoa) Stock Fund 15.90% 1.30 6.71 -8.85 16.79
Benchmarks during the same period:
Risk freeb -- 0.37 0.05 0.26 0.43
S&P 500 -- 0.63 2.21 -4.40 4.33
Monthly return
Employee contributions to their 401(k) accounts can be made with either pre- or after-tax dollars. Employees can
contribute 1-16% of eligible pay with some additional restrictions for some highly paid employees. In our sample,
Alcoa usually matches 100% of pre-tax contributions, up to 6% of eligible pay. Employer (Alcoa) contributions are
always invested in the company stock and can only be moved to a di¤erent fund after two years. In the 2004 data
that we are using, the above 13 funds are available for contributions (sorted by the standard deviations of monthly
returns). In the analysis we use as a measure of riskiness of the portfolio the share of employee contributions invested
in those (two) funds that are presented as least risky. Indeed, as apparent from the table, these two funds exhibit
less volatility (and mostly lower expected return). Employees also have the option to invest in a personal choice
retirement account in which they have access to other funds besides the 13 funds just described. Direct contributions
to this fund are not possible, only transfers, and we do not have detailed data on the composition of investments
in these funds. For our analysis we only use direct employee contributions. In 2004 only about 28 percent of the
sample rebalances and 24 percent of the sample changes the allocation of their contributions. The average employee
contribution in the baseline sample (which restricts attention to non-zero contributions) is around $4,600. About 40
percent of the sample has no contributions to the risk free funds, and about 17 percent invest all their contributions
in the risk free funds. Just over 40 percent of the sample has some employee contributions invested in company stock.
The series of returns are based on monthly returns over the 29 month period from August 2005 to December 2007,
which was the longest time period for which we have consistent returns data for all funds. Returns data are from
CRSP (when available), or from Hewitt (when CRSP data are not available, for the few funds that are not publicly
traded).
a We compute the share of dollars contributed to each fund out of total 401(k) contributions made by all employees
in our baseline sample.
b For the risk free benchmark we use the CRSP three month Fama Risk Free Rates series, which are derived from
average lending and borrowing rates.
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